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Abstract—Natural human capacities are becoming 
increasingly mismatched to the enormous data volumes, 
processing capabilities, and decision speeds demanded in today’s 
aviation environment. Increasingly Autonomous Systems (IAS) 
are uniquely suited to solve this problem. NASA is conducting 
research and development of IAS - hardware and software 
systems, utilizing machine learning algorithms, seamlessly 
integrated with humans whereby task performance of the 
combined system is significantly greater than the individual 
components. IAS offer the potential for significantly improved 
levels of performance and safety that are superior to either human 
or automation alone. 
A human-in-the-loop test was conducted in NASA Langley’s 
Integration Flight Deck B-737-800 simulator to evaluate advanced 
synoptic pages with simplified interactive electronic checklists as 
an IAS for routine air carrier flight operations and in response to 
aircraft system failures. Twelve U.S. airline crews flew various 
normal and non-normal procedures and their actions and 
performance were recorded in response to failures. These data are 
fundamental to and critical for the design and development of 
future increasingly autonomous systems that can better support 
the human in the cockpit. Synoptic pages and electronic checklists 
significantly improved pilot responses to non-normal scenarios, 
but implementation of these aids and other intelligent assistants 
have barriers to implementation (e.g., certification cost) that must 
be overcome.   
Keywords—flight crew error, aviation safety, synoptic displays, 
automation, automation surprise, unreliable airspeed, hydraulic 
systems failure 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is known that natural human capacities are becoming 
increasingly mismatched to the enormous data volumes, 
processing capabilities, and decision speeds demanded in 
today’s aviation environment [1]. Autonomy is uniquely suited 
to solve this problem where intelligent machines are seamlessly 
integrated with humans so that task performance of the 
combined system is significantly greater than the individual 
components. By creating human-autonomy teaming and 
associated technologies, levels of safety and performance above 
and beyond that provided by either one singularly can be 
achieved, especially during off-nominal events or in conditions 
where less experienced or knowledgeable operators are 
involved. If this approach to human-autonomy teaming 
successfully raises the level of safety and performance 
experienced in aviation today, then there should be an increase 
to the acceptance of autonomy and the implementation of 
autonomy systems in aviation.  
The power and capabilities of machine learning algorithms, 
perception and sensing systems, and computing systems are 
increasing exponentially; however, the fundamental 
technologies and guidance for autonomous systems in aviation 
operations are missing. Under the Aviation Operations and 
Safety Program (AOSP), Safe Autonomous Systems Operations 
(SASO) project, NASA Langley Research Center (NASA 
LaRC) conducted development of Increasingly Autonomous 
Systems (IAS). IAS are hardware and software systems, 
utilizing machine learning algorithms, that have the 
responsibility to meet defined goals with little or no direction, 
but with appropriate levels of involvement, from a human. The 
research focused on autonomous concepts and technologies 
designed to replicate the performance of an expert pilot in 
monitoring, assessing, and decision-making functions that will, 
during nominal and off-nominal situations, continuously 
identify risk, and determine/prioritize actions needed to mitigate 
risk. NASA, through this work and others, intends to develop 
guidelines for the human-autonomy interfaces through which 
these autonomous concepts and technologies will 
communicate/interact with, and assist the pilot to safely 
accomplish the basic aviate, navigate, and communicate tasks 
in-flight. These technologies would support a crew especially 
when insufficient system knowledge, flight crew procedures, or 
NASA’s Airspace Operations and Safety Program, Safe Autonomous 
Systems Operations Project. 
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understanding of the aircraft state decrease the pilot’s ability to 
respond, especially in failure situations or situations for which 
standard operating procedures do not exist. 
A simulation experiment was conducted to begin the 
development and validation of IAS concepts and technologies 
under nominal, off-nominal, and emergency conditions. This 
work was directed toward the identified National Research 
Council barrier [2] of “How can we assure that advanced IAS – 
especially those systems that rely on adaptive/nondeterministic 
software – will enhance rather than diminish the safety and 
reliability of the National Air Space (NAS).” The specific IAS 
concept tested was the use of advanced synoptic pages and 
simplified electronic checklists (ECLs) for pilot use during 
routine air carrier operations and in response to aircraft systems 
affected by a failure (e.g., loss of hydraulic system) or loss of 
flight critical data (e.g., reliable airspeed information). 
II. BACKGROUND 
The following background provides motivation for 
advanced synoptic and simplified ECL research as an IAS 
concept for a Boeing 737 and provides aircraft system 
description details only as necessary to understand the failures, 
hydraulic leak and blocked pitot tube, manipulated in this 
experiment. 
A. Boeing 737 
The Boeing 737 family of aircraft was first flown in 1967 
and over 10,000 aircraft have been built. Three variants, 737 
Classic, 737 Next Generation, and 737 Max, have been 
developed from the original 737 design. The 737-800 is from the 
Boeing 737 Next Generation series but systems and display 
configurations are not representative of current generation 
advanced aircraft like the Boeing 787 or the Airbus A350. For 
instance, the aircraft does not have integrated electronic 
checklists (ECLs) or system synoptic pages (i.e., graphical 
depiction of aircraft systems). The lower display unit is 
sometimes flown with nothing displayed or sometimes flown 
with a system status page shown. Checklists are typically 
displayed on a portable electronic device issued to each crew 
member (i.e., Electronic Flight Bag, EFB) and the quick 
reference handbook (QRH) is typically in paper form in the 
cockpit although some operators are using QRHs on their EFBs.  
Hydraulic pressure at 3000 psi is normally provided by two 
systems, each with an engine-driven pump and an electric pump, 
and designated System A and System B. A standby system is 
provided with an electric pump for redundancy. The systems are 
designed in the event of a failure to load-shed, yet maintain 
sufficient functionality. Either Hydraulic System A or B can 
power all flight controls with no decrease in airplane 
controllability. System A also provides hydraulics for landing 
gear, ground spoilers, alternate brakes, Engine 1 thrust reverser, 
Autopilot A, normal nose wheel steering, and power transfer 
unit. System B provides hydraulics for leading edge flaps and 
slats, normal brakes, Engine 2 thrust reverser, Autopilot B, 
alternate nose wheel steering, landing gear transfer unit, 
autoslats, yaw damper, and trailing edge flaps. System A failures 
may require alternate gear extension and System B failures may 
require alternate flap extension. (The failure used for the 
experiment was a System B failure that required alternate flap 
extension. Alternate flap extension utilizes an electric motor and 
flap extension takes a much greater amount of time, requiring 
advanced planning for the approach and landing.)  
The air data systems uses two air data modules to provide 
pitot and static pressure data to the air data inertial reference 
unit. An alternate pitot and static probe are used to drive standby 
instruments. The air data inertial reference system calculates 
airspeed, altitude, pitch, roll, heading, true airspeed, ground 
speed, and temperature among other parameters and provide that 
information to the display interface unit for display on the pilot 
forward displays. The display interface unit compares flight 
critical data and provides alerts to the pilot. If airspeed 
calculated from one system is different than the other system, an 
IAS DISAGREE message is displayed on both pilot primary 
flight displays (PFDs). (The failure used for this experiment was 
a blocked left pitot tube resulting in unreliable airspeed 
indications on the left PFD.) 
B. Automation Complexity 
Current generation advanced aircraft like the Boeing 787 or 
the Airbus A350 added design elements to improve the pilot’s 
ability to handle system failures and their understanding of their 
impacts. Manufacturers have integrated checklists and provided 
synoptic pages that are helpful to pilots in troubleshooting 
failures. Integrated interactive ECLs are now standard on the 
latest aircraft and are even presented on the forward displays in 
some aircraft [3]. To create these capabilities, automation 
complexity has increased. These systems are also still dependent 
on sensor systems that may introduce unforeseen consequences 
when failures occur. 
Data shows that complex system failures continue to 
challenge airline pilots, even in the latest generation of aircraft 
[4] [5]. When the status of an item can be verified by the system, 
the ECL step is automatically completed. Although checklists 
have been integrated and made interactive, the overall checklist 
design has not changed from the paper versions of the past. One 
issue with the current electronic checklist system is that it based 
on annunciated failures. If the failure is not annunciated, for 
example the unreliable airspeed due to a blocked pitot tube used 
in this experiment, the appropriate checklist is not immediately 
displayed and the crew is required to find the correct checklist 
manually. Even though many current aircraft in revenue service 
do not have integrated checklists, most airlines currently utilize 
portable electronic devices for checklists and reference 
information.  
Synoptic pages were developed after the introduction of 
EICAS. The lack of synoptic information [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], 
[11] on older aircraft was identified as an issue, especially in 
working complex system failures where a failure presented 
multiple symptoms like electrical failures or engine failures. 
Synoptic pages were initially designed to represent systems 
controlled on the overhead panel [12]. In general, they show an 
electronic version of electro-mechanical legacy systems. These 
synoptic pages do not show flight critical data (e.g., airspeed, 
altitude, attitude, position). They are not required to be displayed 
but allow the crew to reference the synoptic while completing 
the checklist.  
As electro-mechanical systems and engines have become 
more reliable, much of the pilot decision-making during 
troubleshooting has been reduced. Computer systems on the 
other hand have become exceeding complex. No information is 
currently available to help pilots in troubleshooting computer 
systems and the software connectivity generally hides all the 
information flow from the pilot [13].  
C. Unreliable Airspeed 
Modern aircraft design is predicated on systems providing 
redundancy and managing failure modes such that critical 
failures are eliminated. For many systems, this provides a good 
design decision and provides for automation and alerting to 
adequately help in diagnosing failures. Failure mode effects are 
analyzed [14] and any catastrophic failures are mitigated. This 
analysis identifies and eliminates common mode failures that 
cause multiple redundant systems to fail the same way.  
The effectiveness of these systems can be negated by their 
dependency on mechanical sensors that creates an impact across 
all systems in the same way.  The airspeed probes appear to be 
one such system. Failures due to maintenance [15], volcanic ash 
accumulation [16] and high altitude icing events [17] are just 
some ways where the system has not worked as designed, often 
with catastrophic consequences.  
Experienced pilots gather information from multiple 
redundant sources to determine which conflicting information is 
correct. This experience was often gained from knowledge 
acquired during their early training with systems that are not as 
reliable as they are today. Without that knowledge, 
troubleshooting becomes more difficult. The situation is often 
aggravated due to proximity of turbulence and reduced visibility 
that contribute to the confusion of conflicting information. To 
address this problem, airlines and the FAA focused significant 
effort in recognition of unreliable airspeed [18], and 
manufacturers redesigned checklists by adding some of the 
knowledge steps that experienced pilots use. Studies [7] show 
that airline pilots still have significant confusion regarding 
airspeed failures.  
Diagnosing airspeed failures continues to affect even the 
most modern aircraft [19]. System designers have only recently 
started using multiple sources of information when alerting 
pilots for air data issues. One manufacturer derives a synthetic 
airspeed and GPS-provided altitude for detected failures. 
Although blocked pitot tubes events are rare, the resulting 
erroneous or unreliable airspeed failure mode can be 
catastrophic. In a simulator session with two recently certified 
aircraft, the blocked pitot failure was shown to still present 
issues. Both aircraft systems use voted air data to present 
information to the pilot and the exact source is not shown to the 
pilot. Failure of one pitot probe does not produce any flight deck 
effect nor is the pilot informed of the failure in either aircraft 
system. Failure of the second pitot probe produced no flight deck 
effect in either aircraft system. One aircraft system provided an 
advisory message and the other aircraft system provided no 
information to the pilot. Failure of the third and final pitot probe 
in one aircraft system provided switching to a backup-calculated 
airspeed on the left primary flight display and a caution message 
to both pilots. The other aircraft system displayed a caution 
message that the only remaining correct system - the standby 
airspeed display - was failed and the automation continued to 
remain engaged and followed the incorrect information. If 
descending, the aircraft continued to add full power and 
continued to increase the actual speed of the aircraft past design 
limits. The behavior exhibited in the simulator is expected to 
reflect actual aircraft behavior since aircraft software is used in 
both. This is just a single example of how complex systems can 
be, even to an experienced design engineer who has days or 
weeks to evaluate a problem.  
III. METHOD 
An experiment was conducted to evaluate advanced synoptic 
pages with simplified checklists as an IAS concept to better 
support pilots during complex and time-sensitive air carrier 
flight operations. Twelve U.S. airline crews flew various normal 
and non-normal procedures and their actions and performance 
were recorded in response to failures. These data are 
fundamental to and critical for the design and development of 
future increasingly autonomous systems that can better support 
the human in the cockpit. 
A. Experiment Design 
The experiment used a between-subjects design to evaluate 
synoptic pages with simplified ECLs as an IAS for 737-800 
aircraft during nominal and off nominal flight conditions. Each 
crew flew 3 runs, one nominal and two off nominal, for this 
experiment. The nominal run was a complete flight from takeoff 
to landing and was used as a baseline run for workload, crew 
resource management, and other subjective measures. The off-
nominal runs flown resulted in either a left hydraulic systems 
failure or unreliable airspeed information for the left PFD.  
Two display configurations were evaluated – a “baseline” 
with standard B-737 displays and interactive ECLs, and an 
“advanced technology” that incorporated advanced synoptic 
pages to the B-737 displays and used simplified interactive 
ECLs. Although the 737 aircraft design does not use interactive 
ECLs, this functionality was added for this study so that 
checklist usage was not an experimental variable.  
The nominal run used the advanced technology display 
configuration and was always presented as the first flight. Each 
crew experienced both failures but only one failure with the 
baseline and one with the advanced synoptic pages with 
simplified ECLs. The baseline display configuration was always 
used for the second run and the advanced configuration for the 
third run. The off nominal runs were equally distributed among 
the crews, resulting in 6 crews having the hydraulic failure for 
run 2 and unreliable airspeed for run 3 and 6 crews having the 
unreliable airspeed for run 2 and hydraulic failure for run 3.  
Both display configurations used standard 737-800 displays 
(PFDs, Navigation Displays, NDs, and EICAS) on the upper 
display units. They differed in what was displayed on the 
Systems page shown on the lower display unit (standard 737 
systems or advanced synoptic) and the checklists (standard or 
simplified) displayed on the EFB.  
The baseline display configuration used the standard 737-
800 systems page on the lower display unit (Fig. 1) and standard 
checklists on the EFB.  
 
The advanced technology display configuration used new 
and enhanced synoptic pages designed to work with simplified 
ECLs. Advanced synoptic pages provided graphical depiction of 
systems affected by a failure or loss of flight critical data. 
Checklists were simplified by removing notes that described in 
textual form which items were failed or degraded as they were 
now available on the synoptic. There was no loss of information 
as the pilot uses the synoptic page(s) and simplified checklist in 
conjunction with each other. Table lookup items such as 
minimum advisory landing distances based on runway condition 
were provided on the synoptic instead of requiring pilot lookup 
and interpolation of data in QRH tables; thus, saving valuable 
time to run a non-normal checklist. Fig. 2 shows the fuel 
synoptic page that was presented on the lower display unit when 
using the advanced synoptic design. Fig. 3 shows the fuel 
synoptic page when a hydraulic failure occurred. Note that the 
fuel synoptic remained and additional information was provided 
about the failure. The advanced display configuration used 
automatic switching of the synoptic displays during a failure. 
Fig. 4 shows the system interactive synoptic (SIS) on the lower 
display unit for any failure of flight critical data that was 
displayed on the normal pilot displays. This synoptic shows that 
the left PFD has unreliable airspeed information (due to the 
blocked pitot tube). The NASA-developed SIS supplements 
checklists by graphically providing information on flight critical 
data that would otherwise be communicated in text.  
B. Failures 
The hydraulic failure was modeled as a large leak, at a rate 
of 6 gallons per minute, in the System B reservoir. When the 
reservoir quantity dropped to less than 21.0% capacity, the 
System B hydraulics failure was annunciated to the flight crew 
through illumination of the: a) ENG 2 (engine-driven pump) and 
ELEC 1 (electric-motor-driven pump) LOW PRESSURE lights 
on the forward overhead hydraulic panel; and, b) Left and Right 
side MASTER CAUTION lights and HYD system annunciator 
light on the glare shield annunciation panel. Approximately 30 
seconds later, the System B Flight Controls LOW PRESSURE 
light illuminated on the forward overhead flight control panel 
and the MASTER CAUTION lights and FLT system 
annunciator light illuminated on the glare shield. Additionally, 
if the B side autopilot was engaged, it automatically 
disconnected and the autopilot disconnect horn would sound. 
When the B side quantity was fully depleted, the temperature of 
the Electric Motor Driven Pump ramped from 200 degrees to 
235 degrees over 2 minutes, causing the Hydraulic Pump 
OVERHEAT light to illuminate. The A side autopilot was still 
available after the failure. This failure renders the following 
 
Figure 1. System Page on Lower Display Unit 
  
Figure 2. Fuel Synoptic Page on Lower Display Unit 
 
Figure 3. Fuel Synoptic Page with Hydraulic Failure 
Shown on Lower Display Unit 
 
Figure 4. System Interactive Synoptic Page on Lower 
Display Unit 
items inoperative: Autopilot B, two flight spoilers on each wing, 
yaw damper, trailing edge flaps normal hydraulic system, 
leading edge flaps and slats normal hydraulic system, autobrake, 
normal brakes, engine 2 thrust reverser normal hydraulic 
pressure, and alternate nose wheel steering. This failure requires 
a FLAPS 15 landing and alternate flap extension. The time 
required to extend to flaps 15 is approximately 2 minutes with 
alternate flap extension method. 
Unreliable airspeed indications were caused by a blocked 
pitot tube on the left side of the aircraft. The blockage occurred 
while climbing through 15,500 feet on the departure. The 
difference in the indicated airspeed value shown on the left PFD 
and the right PFD caused the IAS DISAGREE light to illuminate 
in approximately 10 seconds. The indicated airspeed on the left 
PFD increasing into the overspeed region caused an erroneous 
overspeed clacker warning which sounded continuously.  
C. Apparatus 
The experiment was conducted in the NASA Langley 
Research Center (LaRC) Integration Flight Deck (IFD) 
simulator, Fig. 5. The study was conducted in full motion with 
the IFD articulated on top of a hexapod hydraulic motion 
system. The IFD simulator cab is populated with flight 
instrumentation, including the overhead subsystem panels, to 
replicate a B-737-800. This facility incorporates fully 
functioning pilot controls with representative force feel and a 
stick shaker system, a flight management system, and 6 
representative flight displays (2 PFDs, 2 NDs, EICAS display 
and lower system display). EFB displays are installed outboard 
on each pilot’s side and were used to display interactive ECLs 
to the crew. A collimated out-the-window scene is produced by 
an Evans and Sutherland Image Generator graphics system 
providing approximately 200 degree horizontal by 40 degree 
vertical field-of-view at 26 pixels per degree.  
D. Participants  
Twenty-four pilots (12 crews), representing three airlines, 
participated in this experiment. Each pilot held an Airline 
Transport Pilot rating and was current in the 737-800 aircraft as 
either Captain or First Officer. Crews were paired from the same 
employer to minimize inter-crew conflicts in Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Crew Resource Management 
(CRM) training. All participants were male, except for one 
female. The Captains’ average age was 55 years with an average 
of 27,000 total flight hours and 2,800 flight hours in the 737-
800. The First Officers’ average age was 49 years with an 
average of 9.000 total flight hours and 1,700 flight hours flying 
as 737-800 First Officer.  
Pilot flying (PF) and pilot monitoring (PM) roles were 
assigned based on the experimental matrix. 
E. Training 
Pilots were type rated and qualified in the B737-800 and the 
simulator was a faithful representation of the aircraft so no 
aircraft specific training was expected or received. An extensive 
briefing about the new technologies being evaluated was 
provided on the first morning, followed by a training session on 
how to utilize the synoptic pages and interactive ECLs. Since 
integrated ECLs and synoptic pages are not standard on the 
Boeing 737 aircraft, a familiarization run from takeoff to landing 
provided a further training opportunity and to re-enforce use of 
ECLs and synoptic pages for normal and non-normal electronic 
checklist usage..  
F. Procedures 
The route of flight flown by the pilots consisted of the 
DOCTR3 departure from the Ronald Reagan Washington 
National Airport (KDCA), proceeding enroute at 17,000 feet, 
then flying the CAMRN4 arrival into the John F Kennedy 
International Airport (KJFK), which connected to special RNP 
RNAV procedure for Runway 13 Left at JFK. The route duration 
was approximately 45 minutes. 
The entire flight was flown as a baseline run from takeoff to 
landing to provide a basis and context for the non-normal or 
failure runs. The hydraulic failure started near top of descent on 
the CAMRN4 arrival. For the unreliable airspeed indication, the 
flight departed from KDCA on the DOCTR3 departure and 
unreliable airspeed indications were experienced in the climb.  
Material representing some of the information provided by 
flight dispatch was given to the pilots, to include a detailed flight 
plan, weather forecasts, and applicable Notices to Airmen.  
Normal aircraft flow was modeled for a portion of the 
eastern United States and the New York area. Scripted and 
computer generated Air Traffic Control (ATC) voice 
communications was provided for all modeled aircraft and 
frequencies, including normal communication with the 
experimental crew. Non-normal and emergency 
communications was provided by a staff member.  Aircraft were 
landing on Runways 13 Left and 22 Left and departing Runway 
13 Right at KJFK. 
IV. RESULTS 
This section provides detailed results that compared and 
contrasted electronic checklists with synoptic pages and 
simplified checklists while handling blocked pitot tube and 
hydraulic system failures. 
A. Failure Handling 
For the right hydraulic failure scenario, the leak began two 
minutes after the descent portion of the approach on the 
 
Figure 5. Integration Flight Deck Simulator 
CAMRN4 arrival started. Approximately 90 seconds later, the 
hydraulics failure was annunciated through the MASTER 
CAUTION lights to the flight crew. All twelve crews correctly 
identified the failure, declared an emergency, and coordinated 
with ATC as they deemed appropriate to handle the failure 
(enter holding, descend, vectors to final, etc.). An ATC 
communication error was observed for a crew using 
conventional ECLs without synoptic pages to handle the 
hydraulic failure. The crew mistakenly accepted a clearance 
(“DIRECT to COVIR”) meant for another aircraft. ATC tried 
several times to get them back on course but crew did not 
acknowledge the error in their read-back of the clearance.  
For the unreliable airspeed indications, indicated airspeed on 
the left PFD started increasing during the climb through 15,500 
feet due to a blocked pitot tube. The difference between the left 
and right indicated airspeed values caused an IAS DISAGREE 
annunciation to be displayed on each PFD. The left indicated 
airspeed increased into the overspeed value. In response to the 
overspeed, the auto-throttle system reduced thrust causing a 
decrease in the aircraft’s airspeed, which was correctly shown 
on the right PFD (the non-failed side). Seven of twelve crews 
declared an emergency, of which five had advanced synoptic 
information and two did not. The one crew with advanced 
synoptic information that did not declare an emergency was the 
only crew that descended in response to the erroneous overspeed 
warning and they subsequently experienced an actual overspeed 
event.  
B. Checklist Usage 
Time-to-complete the correct checklist was used as a metric 
for quick and proper troubleshooting of equipment problems. 
For the System B Hydraulic failure, it was an alerted failure with 
annunciation on the flight deck that had a direct entry in the 
QRH with the Loss of System B checklist. The time-to-complete 
metric for the Loss of System B checklist included time to 
execute all checklist items up to the deferred items in the 
Approach, Alternate Flap Extension, and Before Landing 
checklists. 
As discussed, the checklist usage for Blocked Pitot Tube 
condition was problematic because the first annunciation, IAS 
DISAGREE, points to a checklist with the only action “Refer to 
the unreliable airspeed checklist”, which required crews to 
manually find the Unreliable Airspeed checklist. Fig. 6 shows a 
box plot of the time to complete hydraulic system B checklist 
and Fig. 7 shows a box plot of the time to complete unreliable 
airspeed checklist.  
Crews completed the Loss of System B checklist (up to 
deferred items) significantly earlier (F(1,10)=8.13, p=0.017) 
when using the advanced hydraulic synoptic with simplified 
checklists (Median, M = 4.7 min) compared to conventional 
ECLs without synoptic (M = 8.0 min). There were no crew 
errors when using the advanced hydraulic synoptic with 
simplified checklists during an hydraulic failure. However, one 
out of six crews made an error while using conventional ECLs 
without synoptic during a hydraulic failure. Specifically, the 
crew did not check the non-normal configuration landing 
distance table in the Advisory Information section of the 
Performance Inflight chapter.  
Comparing checklist usage with and without advanced 
synoptic and simplified checklists, an ANOVA revealed 
significant differences for time-to-complete Unreliable 
Airspeed Checklist (F(1,10) = 8.81, p = 0.014). Crews 
completed this checklist significantly earlier when using the 
advanced synoptic page with simplified checklist (M = 2.5 min) 
compared to conventional ECLs without synoptic (M = 6.6 
min). 
C. Workload, Perceived Safety of Flight and Crew Resource 
Management 
The NASA Task Load Index (TLX) captured a subjective 
rating (0 [Low] to 100 [High]) of perceived task load. There are 
six subscales of workload represented in the NASA TLX: 
mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand, 
performance, effort, and frustration level [20]. The overall score 
results of this measure were examined to investigate task load 
variation. Perceived safety of flight was self-assessed after each 
run using a seven point Likert scale with a rating of 1 being 
“completely unacceptable,” a rating of 7 being “completely 
acceptable,” and a rating of 4 being “neutral.” Similarly, CRM 
Ratings for Shared Awareness of Situation were subjectively 
provided by the PF and PM after each run using a seven point 
 
Figure 6. Time to Complete Hydraulic Checklist 
 
Figure 7. Time to Complete Unreliable Airspeed Checklist 
Likert scale with a rating of 1 being “strongly agree”, a rating of 
7 being “strongly disagree”, and at rating of 4 being “neutral”.  
Workload is shown in Fig. 8 for the hydraulic failure and 
Fig. 9 for the airspeed failure. For the hydraulic failure runs, 
pilots rated their overall workload as being moderate as reflected 
in the PF (median rating of 48) and PM (median rating of 39) 
TLX ratings. There were no significant PF or PM workload 
differences between the baseline and advanced synoptic with 
simplified ECL configurations. Workload for the unreliable 
airspeed runs was rated as being moderate for both PF and PM 
and there were no significant workload differences between the 
baseline and advanced synoptic with simplified ECL 
configurations.  
Visual inspection of the pilot subjective data revealed no 
significant perceived safety of flight ratings differences due to 
having a hydraulic synoptic (median safety rating of 6 for with 
and without synoptic). Pilots rated their perceived safety of 
flight as being acceptable (overall mean rating of 6.2) for the 
hydraulic failure runs. Likewise, visual inspection of the 
perceived safety of flight ratings for the unreliable airspeed runs 
showed no significant differences due to having SIS synoptic 
(median rating of 6 for with and without synoptic). Pilots rated 
their perceived safety of flight as being acceptable (overall mean 
rating of 5.9) for the unreliable airspeed runs. 
CRM ratings for Shared Awareness showed a slight 
improvement for the PM for both the unreliable airspeed and 
hydraulic failure runs when the synoptic was present (median 
rating of 1 with synoptic and 2 without synoptic); however, no 
CRM differences were noted for the PF for either failure 
condition. Pilots agreed that they had a “shared awareness of 
situation” for the hydraulic failure (overall mean of 1.7) and 
unreliable airspeed runs (overall mean of 1.5). 
D. System Usability Scores and Pilot Observations 
The System Usability Scale (SUS) questionnaire [21] was 
used to gauge how pilots assessed the perceived usability of the 
interactive ECL and the advanced synoptic with simplified 
interactive ECL. SUS scores were calculated and could range 
from 0 to 100, but they were not percentile ranks. SUS scores 
can be associated with specific letter grades and adjective ratings 
[22]. A SUS score between 63 and 80.3 is considered a “good” 
design and a score above 80.3 is considered an “excellent” 
design. 
Pilots, in general, found the design of the synoptic and 
simplified ECL to be an excellent pilot interface tool (Fig. 10, 
median SUS score of 90) for dealing with non-normal flight 
situations like a hydraulic failure or unreliable airspeed 
indications. Similarly, with a median SUS score of 80, pilots 
thought the interactive ECL design, even without synoptic 
pages, was a good one for dealing with non-normal events. 
Pilot comments collected during post-test debriefings 
support these good to excellent design usability scores for 
interactive ECL and synoptic pages. 
“Synoptic pages were very beneficial during a non-normal 
for the flying pilot. During the hydraulic system failure, I was 
able to clearly see which other systems had been affected and 
were no longer functioning. It speeded up the process of running 
through a non-normal checklist and I was more aware of what 
was/was not functioning.” 
“Synoptic pages help us see what is actually functioning and 
being able to address it quicker. It increases our awareness of 
actual aircraft state.” 
 
Figure 10. System Usability Scores 
 
Figure 9. Workload Airspeed Failure 
 
Figure 8. Workload Hydraulic Failure 
“In a non-normal, the combination of synoptic pages and 
interactive checklists decrease the pilot workload quite 
significantly.  It allows us to focus on flying the airplane.” 
“Interactive checklists, I think would be beneficial in making 
sure a checklist item is not accidently omitted.  They clearly 
show what has/has not been accomplished. They are more 
streamlined and decrease pilot workload especially in high-
traffic, busy environments.”  
V. DISCUSSION 
Troubleshooting strategies differed greatly between crews. 
Prior to initiating the checklist, some crews executed actions 
from memory while others contacted ATC. The crews that 
contacted ATC first tended to be interrupted more frequently 
while accomplishing the checklist, therefore took longer to 
finish the checklist. Crews that initiated memory items took 
longer to start the checklist. For instance, descending with 
unreliable airspeed indications before accomplishing the 
checklist masks the problem and often creates conflicting 
information. The crew that descended using the incorrect 
airspeed on the left PFD created an additional problem by 
actually overspeeding the aircraft while troubleshooting the 
issue. 
The advanced synoptic pages and simplified ECLs support 
better and quicker decision making for the unreliable airspeed 
scenario with the training provided during the experiment. 
Typically crews would be provided more extensive training for 
new technology added to the flight deck. In this scenario, the 
fact that five of six crews declared an emergency with the 
advanced synoptic page when only two of six did for the 
standard ECL is significant. The one crew with synoptic page 
and simplified ECL that didn’t declare an emergency descended 
before looking at the display or the checklists, significantly 
delaying the start of the checklist, and resulting in an aircraft 
overspeed. All crews, regardless of synoptic page or not, 
declared an emergency for the hydraulic failure scenario due to 
the need for alternate flap extension and expedited handling.  
The time to complete the appropriate checklist was 
significantly reduced in both failures when crews were provided 
with advanced synoptic technology. Although no procedural 
steps were removed, the checklists were simplified by removing 
notes that described in textual form which items were failed or 
degraded. Instead, the items were depicted graphically on the 
synoptic page. This alone can result in significant reduction in 
the length of the checklists and has a number of added benefits, 
even when the entire checklist is only reduced by one page. Key 
checklist steps are often elevated to the first page of the checklist 
when notes are reduced. The airspeed checklist was reduced by 
a half and the hydraulic by one forth. The step to cross check 
airspeed indicators was elevated to the first page from the second 
page which quickly allows pilot to determine if a reliable 
airspeed indication is available. The synoptic page provides 
graphical information on which indicator has failed and provides 
known pitch and power settings for use in maintaining aircraft 
control while conducting the procedure instead of relying on 
table information that requires interpolation.  
For the hydraulic checklist, the information to plan a flaps 
15 landing, plan for alternate flap extensions and the non-normal 
landing configuration distance were elevated in the checklist and 
all the notes were depicted graphically on the synoptic page. The 
PF does not have to comprehend what the PM is reading and the 
information is available on the synoptic page throughout the rest 
of the flight and can be reviewed at any time. Some pilot 
comments were: 
• “The picture depiction of the problem was absolutely 
awesome. The situation awareness and safety 
enhancements of such a system display make 
exponentially safer aviation environments.”  
• “Synoptic pages were very beneficial during a non-
normal for the flying pilot. During the hydraulic system 
failure, I was able to clearly see which systems had been 
affected and were no longer functioning.” 
Most of the pilots were unfamiliar with interactive checklists 
since they had flown mainly the 737 aircraft. Some comments 
about the checklists in general were:  
• “The interactive technology is great and I look forward 
to seeing it in the cockpit.”  
• “Interactive checklists, I think would be beneficial in 
making sure a checklist items is not accidently omitted.”  
• “Love the electronic checklists.” 
There were some deficiencies noted as well, especially with 
placement of the checklist on outboard EFB displays and the 
lack of dedicated checklist screens. Some of these have already 
been addressed in current aircraft as the checklists can be 
displayed on the forward displays in both the B-777 and B-787 
aircraft as well as the A350. Some pilot comments were: 
• “You should be able to switch between approach/arrival 
plate and checklist (normal) without exiting menus.” 
•  “Another challenge I faced with the use of checklists had 
to do with the side window location of the electronic 
flight bag. Most current aircraft have them on the 
forward screens. When I was flying with the hydraulic 
issue and the Captain was reading the checklist, he was 
looking away from me when talking and the checklist 
was all the way across the cockpit.”  
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Based on the pilot comments and the system usability 
measures where synoptic pages with simplified electronic 
checklists received high marks, this technology should be 
considered for all aircraft. Synoptic pages have been present in 
the industry for over 20 years but barriers remain for the 
widespread adoption. Certification costs remain high for aircraft 
systems but there are training and aircraft type rating issue to be 
considered as well.  
A risk-based approach for certification is now in place for 
Part 23 aircraft, perhaps the same thing can be applied to Part 
121 aircraft for secondary information like synoptic displays 
allowing reductions in certification costs. Training costs and a 
common type rating are often discussed as barriers when flight 
decks are upgraded like the B737-800 although synoptic pages 
were shown in this experiment to be easy to use and provided a 
safety benefit. 
Synoptic pages are not required items, even in aircraft where 
the displays are part of the type certificate. They may be 
displayed and used with checklists but they are not required. If 
synoptic pages replace items on the checklist, they will now be 
required items with additional certification costs.  
Modern cockpits with large landscape displays that can be 
segmented into multiple multifunction displays are capable of 
providing synoptic and checklist pages on the forward displays 
that would not interfere with the ND and would allow for charts 
and other items to reside on the electronic flight bags without 
switching back and forth. This will be further investigated. 
Further study is needed to explore how far the integration of 
checklists and synoptic pages can proceed to provide the 
optimum mix of compactness and word reduction. The display 
used for the synoptic in this study was a combined system 
synoptic where the normal fuel page was augmented for failures. 
This implementation is different than separate synoptic pages 
utilized in certified systems and some pilots commented on the 
clutter and that the failure was not highlighted enough due to the 
normal elements remaining on the display. Methods to declutter 
displays need to be carefully evaluated. 
Finally, the entire design of the Unreliable Airspeed 
checklist and pilot understanding of the checklist designers 
thought process shows some issues. Even after airline specific 
training in unreliable airspeed, pilots struggle in working the 
procedure. No guidance is given for allowing the aircraft to 
stabilize when changing pitch and power settings, or why they 
are given one set of numbers and then a short time later are given 
yet another set. The auto-throttle and autopilot are disconnected 
which requires the PF to manually fly aircraft and attempt to 
stabilize the airspeed while the crew conducts the checklist, a 
challenging task that has been shown to have problematic 
results. . Notes are provided in the checklist stating that the flight 
path vector symbol may not be valid, but there is only one small 
case where that is true and the symbol is a great help when trying 
to maintain aircraft control. Some airline specific procedures 
vary on this step as well. This issue also requires further thought 
and study. 
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